

3. Defendant TCEQ is an administrative agency of the State of Texas. Service of process may be accomplished by personal delivery of citation to the Executive Director of the TCEQ, Mr. Mark Vickery, P.G., located at 12100 Park 35 Circle, Building F, Austin, Travis County, Texas 78753.

II.
DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN

4. Plaintiff seeks to conduct discovery under a Level 3 Discovery Control Plan.

III.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

5. This is a direct appeal of a unilateral Administrative Order issued by TCEQ on February 12, 2010. A copy of the Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
6. This action is brought pursuant to §§ 361.188(b), 361.321, and 361.322 of the Texas Health and Safety Code. Section 361.321 allows a person affected by a ruling, order, decision or other act of TCEQ to appeal said ruling, order, decision, or other act by filing a petition in district court in Travis County District Court. Plaintiff (along with a large number of other entities) is named by TCEQ in the Order as a party responsible for reimbursing TCEQ's expenses related to certain investigations into potential environmental contamination at a state superfund site, as well as ordered to undertake remedial action, and as such, is clearly affected by the Order. Section 361.322 allows any person subject to an administrative order issued pursuant to Texas Health & Safety Code § 361.272 to appeal said order in district court. Because the Order at issue was issued pursuant to §§ 361.271 and 361.272, and the Plaintiff is a person subject to the Order, § 361.188(b) makes the Order subject to appeal under §§ 361.321 and 361.322.
7. This action is timely filed under the provisions of §§ 361.321 and 361.322. Section 361.321 provides that an appeal must be brought not later than the 30th day after the

ruling, order, decision, or other act of the governmental entity (here, TCEQ) whose action is appealed. TCEQ issued the unilateral order effective as of February 12, 2010. Accordingly, this petition, which is filed within 30 days of that date, is timely. Section 361.322 provides that an appeal brought pursuant to that section must be filed before the 46th day after the date of receipt, hand delivery, or publication service of the order that is being appealed. Accordingly, this petition, which is filed within 46 days of the date of publication and receipt, is timely.

8. Venue is proper in Travis County District Court pursuant to § 361.321(a) of the Texas Health & Safety Code. As stated above, Section 361.321 allows a person affected by a ruling, order, decision or other act of TCEQ to appeal said ruling, order, decision, or other act by filing a petition in Travis County District Court. Plaintiff is a “person affected” by the Order and a “person subject to” the Order because Plaintiff is named as a “responsible party” who has been ordered to conduct remedial activities and reimburse TCEQ’s Hazardous and Solid Waste Remediation Fee Account for costs allegedly incurred by TCEQ.

IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

9. The tract of land designated by TCEQ as the “Voda Petroleum State Superfund Site” (the “*Site*”) is comprised of approximately 6.12 acres located in Gregg County, Texas. According to TCEQ¹ records, the Site was historically used as a waste oil recycling facility from approximately 1981 to 1991, when all operations ceased and the Site was essentially abandoned by the owners and operators.

¹ During some of the events outlined in the Factual Background, the TCEQ was known as the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission. For convenience, the agency is referred to throughout this document by its current name, the TCEQ.

10. In 1995, TCEQ conducted an investigation of the Site to determine if the historic operations had resulted in environmental contaminants entering the groundwater and/or soils at the Site. Part of this investigation included a Hazard Ranking System (“*HRS*”) evaluation of the Site. The HRS is a scoring system used to evaluate potential, relative risk(s) to public health and the environment from releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances. The HRS score assigned to a site as the result of the evaluation is the primary factor in deciding if that site is eligible to be placed on the federal National Priorities List. The HRS score assigned to the Site by TCEQ was not sufficient to qualify the Site as a federal Superfund Site. Instead, the Site was referred in 1995 to the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“*EPA*”) for an immediate removal action to address TCEQ’s belief that the Site presented an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health and the environment.
11. An EPA Action Memorandum, dated March 27, 1996, documented that, in addition to the presence of hazardous substances, the Site received crude oil. The EPA Action Memorandum also noted the presence of large quantities of oil that were subject to the Clean Water Act and the Oil Pollution Act.
12. In 1996, the EPA removed drums of grease or oily wastes, drums of corrosive wastes, aboveground storage tanks, and contaminated soils from the Site. Fencing was also installed around the Site at this time to restrict public access to the Site to insure public health and safety.
13. In December 1997, after the removal action was complete, EPA’s contractor sampled both on-site soils and groundwater as part of a post-removal action assessment. EPA’s contractor found that the removal action had minimized the threat of direct human contact and inhalation threats that may have been present pre-removal.

14. EPA then sought recovery of the costs it incurred in undertaking this removal action, and in 1999 and 2000, EPA settled with a number of companies that EPA had named as potentially responsible parties (“*PRPs*”) for the Site, including Plaintiff.
15. According to the sworn statements of Mr. Voda, taken by EPA, and upon the Plaintiff’s information and belief, during the relevant time frame, different sections of the property were operated by two separate entities – Voda Petroleum and Ultra Oil. Ultra Oil conducted operations on approximately one acre of the property (also known as the “*Southwest Tank Farm*”). While the Southwest Tank Farm was eventually purchased by Mr. Voda, there were no Voda Petroleum operations on the Southwest Tank Farm at any time. EPA stated that the PRPs who sent materials to the Site would not be liable for EPA’s costs associated with the Ultra Oil operations at the Site. EPA further agreed that certain other Plaintiffs would not be responsible for the costs of disposal for certain materials sent to the Site or for remediation of commercial products found at the Site. *See* December 31, 1998, EPA letter to E. Webb and attached Notice at Section 1; *see also*, July 22, 1996 EPA letter to recipients of the USEPA Notice of Liability (Voda Site) at p. 4.
16. TCEQ had knowledge of EPA’s removal action, post-removal sampling and assessment results, and of the EPA settlement. Plaintiff is unaware of any TCEQ correspondence commenting on or disputing the sufficiency of the EPA removal action at the time of the removal action itself or immediately following the removal action.
17. Three years after the EPA removal action was completed, and without re-scoring the Site under the HRS, TCEQ proposed the Site for listing on the State Superfund Registry on November 17, 2000, and published a Notice of that proposal in the Texas Register (25 Tex. Reg. 11594).

18. In November 2000, TCEQ also sent correspondence to certain entities it believed had historically shipped materials to the Site. That correspondence asserted that the recipient was considered by TCEQ to be a PRP at the Site as defined in § 361.271 of the Texas Health & Safety Code (the Texas Superfund Statute), and therefore potentially responsible for environmental investigation and eventual remediation at the Site. The correspondence informed the recipients of the Site's proposed listing on the State Registry and the date for submitting comments on the proposed listing. The correspondence included a Notice of Opportunity to Make Good Faith Offer to conduct a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study ("*RI/FS*") at the Site. This correspondence was not sent to every entity now listed by TCEQ as a responsible party for the Site. Several of the entities who were sent the TCEQ correspondence submitted written comments and objections, particularly complaining that there was no empirical data to support TCEQ's imminent and substantial endangerment finding and no evidence to support listing the Site on the State Superfund Registry.
19. Upon information and belief, despite the statutory requirement to notify all persons potentially responsible for the Site's contamination, the November 2000 Notice of an opportunity to conduct the RI/FS was not provided to approximately 150 entities for which TCEQ then had records in its possession allegedly identifying these companies as entities that had allegedly shipped materials to the Site. Accordingly, these entities had no knowledge of, and, therefore, no opportunity to participate in, TCEQ's proposed RI/FS or to provide comments on the Site's proposed listing on the State Registry, despite TCEQ's knowledge of their alleged shipments to the Site.
20. On or about March 6, 2001, TCEQ sent correspondence to several of the entities who had allegedly shipped significant quantities of material to the Site and who had received the TCEQ RI/FS Notice as PRPs. That correspondence informed each of those entities that

TCEQ decided to remove them from TCEQ's PRP list, effectively releasing these entities from liability related to the Site without payment of any costs associated with the Site. In several of these letters, TCEQ cited as the reason for removing the PRP the so-called CERCLA "petroleum exclusion." Since removal of these entities from the PRP list, TCEQ staff has reconsidered its position and no longer releases entities from liability pursuant to the "petroleum exclusion." The entities receiving these letters are not named as parties to the Order.

21. According to its records, TCEQ undertook remedial investigations and a feasibility study at the Site from 2001 through 2008.
22. In June, 2008, TCEQ issued a Remedy Selection Document. This document provides a discussion of, and TCEQ's conclusions regarding, a proposed remedy for the Site. The remedy proposed by TCEQ consists of soil removal and off-site disposal, together with the installation of a bio-reactive barrier in the groundwater. TCEQ estimates that this remedy will cost \$1.2 Million dollars.
23. Prior to issuance of the Order, PRPs and Defendant were contacted by a well-respected environmental firm, Weston Solutions ("**Weston**"). Weston specializes in environmental remediation efforts and has extensive experience solving complex remediation challenges in a safe and cost-effective manner. Prior to issuance of the Order, Weston suggested that a remedial action at the Site that is "technologically feasible and reliable and that effectively mitigates or minimizes damage to and provides adequate protection of the public health and safety of the environment" could be performed at a substantially lower cost than proposed by the Defendant. On February 25, 2010, Weston sampled seven wells at the Site and reported results to Defendant that indicate that Weston's view is supported by current conditions at the Site.

24. On February 12, 2010, TCEQ issued its unilateral Order with respect to the Site to 350 parties, including Plaintiff. There was no evidentiary hearing held before the Order was issued, nor was there an opportunity for such an evidentiary hearing.
25. The Order makes various Findings of Fact, including listing persons identified by TCEQ as RPs for the solid waste and/or hazardous substances at the Site. The Order further includes a Conclusion of Law that the RPs are responsible parties. Among those listed as RPs are Texas Utilities Generating Company and Dallas Power & Light Company.
26. The Order purports to establish, among other things, (1) the RPs for the Site, (2) the existence of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance or solid waste, and (3) that there is an imminent and substantial endangerment. It then orders the RPs to reimburse TCEQ for all costs related to the RI/FS, to reimburse TCEQ's past and future costs in some unspecified amount, to undertake remedial activities based on the Remedy Selection Document, and to provide post-construction financial assurance, among other responsibilities. The Order also asserts that stipulated penalties accrue for failure to comply with the Order or its deadlines. The Order does not specify the amount of the TCEQ costs, or explain why they are reasonable or appropriate or why TCEQ's actions were necessary or appropriate. Rather, the Order states that the RPs will receive at some time in the future a demand letter from TCEQ stating the amount owed. As authority for the Order, TCEQ cites to the Texas Health & Safety Code, Chapter 361, §§ 361.188 (Final Administrative Order) and 361.272 (Administrative Orders Concerning Imminent and Substantial Endangerment).

V.
DENIALS

27. Plaintiff demands TCEQ meets its evidentiary burden of proof that: (i) the Site constitutes an imminent and substantial endangerment and (ii) that Plaintiff is liable for

Site-related environmental remediation and/or associated costs as required in § 361.322(g) of the Texas Health & Safety Code.

28. Plaintiff denies that it has caused or contributed to the alleged release or threatened release of any solid waste or hazardous substances from or at the Site that are causing or contributing to alleged environmental contamination at the Site.
29. Plaintiff denies that it has committed acts or omissions which have resulted in any release or threatened release of solid waste or hazardous substances from or at the Site.
30. Plaintiff denies that it is a PRP or an RP as defined in the Order. The evidence relied upon by TCEQ to establish that Plaintiff contributed any amount of solid waste and/or hazardous substances to the Site is inherently unreliable, is hearsay, and is not supported by any other corroborating documentary evidence. Further, Plaintiff was given no opportunity to challenge or rebut this so-called “evidence” in violation of its due process and other legal rights.
31. Plaintiff denies that it sent solid wastes to the Site as defined by relevant law.
32. Plaintiff denies that the contamination at the Site constitutes an “actual or threatened release of solid waste that presents an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health and safety or the environment” as required by Texas Health & Safety Code §§ 361.272(a) and 361.188(a)(1) to support Order issuance. The definition of imminent and substantial endangerment as defined in TCEQ’s rules at 30 Tex. Admin. Code § 335.342 is as follows: “A danger is imminent if, given the entire circumstances surrounding each case, exposure of persons or the environment to hazardous substances is more likely than not to occur in the absence of preventive action. A danger is substantial if, given the current state of scientific knowledge, the harm to public health and safety or the environment which would result from exposure could cause adverse

environmental or health effects.” Plaintiff denies that this Site met this standard at the time the Order was issued because, among other things:

- a. Exposure of persons or the environment to hazardous substances was not “more likely than not to occur” because the EPA contractor’s assessment found that the 1997 EPA removal action had minimized the threat of direct human contact and inhalation threats that may have been present pre-removal; residual contamination was covered with clean soil and grass; and the Site was fenced to preclude public access;
- b. TCEQ’s 2009 Remedy Selection Document, at p. 3-4, states that the Site is not a threat to ecological resources because there are insignificant ecological exposure pathways at the Site;
- c. Exposure from contaminated groundwater is not likely, due to gradient direction and plume stability data provided to TCEQ documenting that constituents of concern have not continued to migrate and in fact may be attenuating significantly;
- d. TCEQ’s 2009 Remedy Selection Document, at p. 2, acknowledges that the EPA response action “removed the immediate threat to human health and the environment;” and
- e. Upon information and belief, although TCEQ has studied the Site, TCEQ has not taken any remedial actions to protect humans or the environment from potential exposure pathways from 1997 until the present, including a three-year period between the EPA removal action and the TCEQ proposed listing on the State Superfund Registry and an eight year RI/FS period.

33. Plaintiff denies that proper statutory notice of the RI/FS was given, and thus denies that the Order is reasonable.
34. Plaintiff denies that the Order is supported by the preponderance of the evidence as to TCEQ's claims of necessity, appropriateness, and reasonableness of past and future investigations and remedial and removal costs incurred by TCEQ. This includes the TCEQ determinations related to imminent and substantial endangerment.
35. Plaintiff denies that materials it is alleged to have sent to the Site have caused or contributed to the remedial activities ordered to be conducted by TCEQ in the Order.
36. Plaintiff denies that it is liable for remedial actions or costs associated with the Southwest Tank Farm, also known as Ultra Oil.
37. Plaintiff denies that it is liable for remedial actions or costs of remedial actions associated with the paraffin materials sent to the Site or the commercial products sent to the Site.
38. Plaintiff denies it is an "arranger" for purposes of liability under the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act, based on the United States Supreme Court's ruling in *Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., et al. v. United States*, as the requisite intent was not present or because it does not otherwise meet the definition of an arranger.
39. In the alternative, Plaintiff asserts that it is no more than a *de minimis* contributor to any contamination at the Site.
40. For all the reasons stated in this Petition, Plaintiff denies that the Order is reasonable and therefore it must be overturned pursuant to Texas Health & Safety Code § 361.321(e).

VI.
ORDER IS INVALID

41. The Order lacks finality because it requires additional, discretionary actions by TCEQ. Specifically, the Order requires TCEQ to make discretionary decisions in the future about

the eligibility, necessity, appropriateness, and reasonableness of past and future TCEQ costs to be paid by Plaintiff as an RP, and even the amount of those costs. Accordingly, the Order is neither effective nor enforceable against any Plaintiff, and is of no legal effect.

42. At no time prior to the issuance of the Order did TCEQ afford Plaintiff an opportunity for an adjudicative hearing as to its status as a PRP or RP. As a result, Plaintiff has had no opportunity to protect its interests before being adversely affected by the actions taken by the authority of the Order. The Order violates due process rights afforded by the United States Constitution (U.S. CONST. art. XIV) and Texas Constitution (TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19).
43. The Order further violates Plaintiff's United States and Texas due process rights because it does not afford Plaintiff the opportunity for an adjudicative hearing as to the necessity, appropriateness, and reasonableness of past and future investigation and remedial costs incurred by TCEQ for which it seeks a reimbursement. As a result, Plaintiff has had no opportunity to protect its interests before being adversely affected by the actions taken by the authority of the Order. At no time prior to the issuance of the Order was Plaintiff afforded an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threatened release is divisible pursuant to Texas Health & Safety Code § 361.276. As a result, Plaintiff has had no opportunity to protect its interests before being adversely affected by the actions taken by the authority of the Order.
44. The Order is invalid because the remedy selected does not comply with the standards found in Texas Health & Safety Code §§ 361.193 and 361.322(h). Section 361.193 provides that "[t]he appropriate extent of the remedial action at any particular facility *shall be* determined by the commission's selection of the remedial alternative that the

commission determines is the *lowest cost* alternative that is technologically feasible and reliable and that effectively mitigates or minimizes damage to and provides adequate protection of the public health and safety of the environment.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 361.193. Thus, TCEQ is required by statute to give due consideration to the “lowest cost alternative.” Section 361.322(h) states that a remedial action cannot be upheld if the court determines that the remedy is “arbitrary or unreasonable.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 361.322(h).

- a. TCEQ has classified the groundwater at the Site to be Class I groundwater, when in fact it should be Class II. If the proper classification had been used by TCEQ, the appropriate remedy for this Site would very likely have been the lowest cost alternative that is technologically feasible and reliable and that effectively mitigates and minimizes damage to and provides adequate protection of the public health and safety or the environment. The most recent data acquired from the Site by Weston indicate that an alternative remedy would be appropriate because the groundwater plume boundary has not grown and the concentrations of the constituents of concern identified by TCEQ have actually decreased over time.
- b. For the future costs of remediating the Site, TCEQ seeks \$1.2 million. A remedy at that cost can be shown to be “arbitrary and unreasonable” due to the presence of another, lower cost, remedial alternative. As indicated above, Weston has indicated that it can likely perform a remedial action that is “technologically feasible and reliable and that effectively mitigates or minimizes damage to and provides adequate protection of the public health and safety of the environment” at a cost less than \$1.2 million. Per the foregoing statutory provisions, TCEQ’s refusal to consider a lower cost remedial alternative is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.

- c. Effective May 25, 2007, the Municipal Settings Designation (“*MSD*”) statute was amended to allow small municipalities to have the benefit of the MSD certification. The MSD statute allows municipalities to enforce specific deed restrictions on properties within their city limits restricting the use of the groundwater beneath the property so that it cannot be used as drinking water. The deed restriction acts as an institutional control to protect human health, but at a fraction of the costs of a groundwater remediation plan. The Site is within the City of Clarksville and thus is potentially eligible for an MSD. The MSD is recognized by statute to be protective of human health and the environment. No statute or regulation prohibits the application of an MSD at a state Superfund Site. The Feasibility Study was issued in January of 2008 and the Remedy Selection Document was issued in June 2008. Neither document even evaluated the MSD option, which at that point in time was certainly available for consideration and which could very well be the lowest cost remedy for groundwater at the Site. Thus, the Order is invalid in that it selects a remedy that is arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore cannot be upheld pursuant to Texas Health & Safety Code § 361.323(h).
45. The Order imposes liability on certain entities who are in the same position as other entities who were released by TCEQ from liability under the so-called “petroleum exclusion” exception of CERCLA. This violates the equal protection clauses of both the United States and Texas Constitutions.
46. The Order names many Plaintiffs who did not receive the required statutory notice (referred to previously as the No-Notice Plaintiffs) that was provided to some of the named RPs via the November 6, 2000, Notice of Opportunity to Make a Good Faith Offer for the RI/FS. Texas Health & Safety Code §§ 361.184(b) and 361.185 require

TCEQ to make “all reasonable efforts” to identify PRPs and to provide identified PRPs with written notice of an opportunity to make a Good Faith Offer to fund or perform the RI/FS. While TCEQ did send correspondence to some of the PRPs seeking a good faith offer to fund or perform the RI/FS, on information and belief, approximately 150 companies (or close to 50% of the PRPs) did not receive an opportunity to make a good faith offer, even though TCEQ has acknowledged that it had in its actual possession since 1998 records containing the names of those companies as allegedly shipping materials to the Site. The Texas Health & Safety Code creates a statutory scheme in which the culmination of the RI/FS process – the proposed remedy – is what serves as the basis for the Remedy Order. TCEQ’s RI/FS Notice defect means that approximately 50% of the identifiable PRPs at this Site had no opportunity to participate in the RI/FS process through public comments or otherwise. The failure to comply with the statutory notice requirements related to the RI/FS Notice renders the Order invalid, arbitrary, and unreasonable, and outside the scope of the TCEQ’s statutory authority.

- a. Plaintiff has asserted previously in this Petition that the Order violates certain of Plaintiff’s constitutional equal protection rights because TCEQ relieved certain PRPs, but not others similarly situated, from liability based on the CERCLA “petroleum exclusion.” Without waiving that argument, Plaintiff alternatively asserts that, if the released PRPs are not entitled to the petroleum exclusion, those PRPs must be named in the Order as RPs. Section 361.188 (a)(4) and (6) of the Texas Health & Safety Code states that the final administrative order *must* list the RPs and order the RPs to remediate the facility and reimburse TCEQ’s RI/FS costs. The Order is invalid for failure to name all RPs.
- b. The TCEQ’s unilateral order of the payment of stipulated penalties is beyond the authority of the TCEQ.

47. The Order is invalid under § 361.188(a)(1) of the Texas Health & Safety Code because it does not establish the Site as an imminent and substantial endangerment as needed to support listing on the State Superfund Registry. There is no evidence of imminent and substantial endangerment. Any imminent and substantial endangerment was abated by the 1996 EPA removal action.
48. The Order should be deemed invalid as to Plaintiff because TCEQ did not otherwise properly carry out its statutory and regulatory duties to fully investigate and identify PRPs, RPs, and *de minimis* parties prior to naming Plaintiff as a RP.
49. For all of the reasons previously stated in this Petition, the Order is invalid, arbitrary, and unreasonable pursuant to Texas Health & Safety Code § 361.321(e).

VII.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

50. Plaintiff contributed materials to the Site that are the same as those materials contributed by entities that have been released by the TCEQ pursuant to the “petroleum exclusion” of CERCLA and thus Plaintiff is also entitled to such a release.
51. Even if Plaintiff had contributed materials to the Site, those materials were sold as a useful product, and did not constitute an arrangement for the processing, storing, or disposal of a solid waste, and did not contribute to the release or threatened release to the environment.
52. Plaintiff did not intend for waste or hazardous substances to be disposed of at the Site.
53. Plaintiff asserts that is not an RP, but in the alternative asserts it is no more than a *de minimis* contributor to any contamination at the Site.
54. Plaintiff is not liable for remedial actions or costs associated with the Southwest Tank Farm, also known as Ultra Oil.

55. Plaintiff denies that it is liable for remedial actions or costs of remedial actions associated with the paraffin materials sent to the Site or the commercial products sent to the Site
56. The evidence demonstrates that the Site does not pose an imminent and substantial endangerment.
57. TCEQ failed to provide the required notices necessary to support recovery of investigation costs from the PRPs.
58. The facts do not support listing the Site on the State Superfund registry or the use of the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act to impose liability upon Plaintiff.
59. In the alternative, even if Plaintiff contributed solid waste or hazardous substances to the Site, the costs are subject to apportionment under the Texas Health & Safety Code § 361.343.
60. To the extent any RP named in the Order has gone through bankruptcy or otherwise became insolvent between 2000 and 2010, thus creating an “orphan share” for that party’s liability and volume of materials sent to the Site, Plaintiff does not bear responsibility for such orphan share(s).

VIII.
COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES

61. Plaintiff has had to employ legal counsel to contest the Order. TCEQ is liable for Plaintiff’s reasonable attorney’s fees and reasonable costs pursuant to the Texas Health & Safety Code § 361.342.

IX.
JURY DEMAND

62. Plaintiff requests a jury as the trier of fact for this matter.

X.
PRAYER

63. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that TCEQ be cited to appear and answer and that TCEQ be required to prove its allegations against Plaintiff by a preponderance of the evidence and that the Court on final trial enter an order:
- a. Finding that TCEQ's Order lacks finality, is of no legal effect, and is not enforceable; and/or
 - b. Finding that TCEQ's Order violates the due process laws and/or equal protection laws of the United States and Texas Constitutions and is therefore invalid, and not enforceable; and/or
 - c. Finding that TCEQ's Order is invalid, arbitrary, or unreasonable and therefore must be overturned pursuant to Texas Health & Safety Code § 361.321(e); and/or
 - d. Invalidating the portion of TCEQ's Order that purports to establish Plaintiff as a PRP or RP; and/or
 - e. Finding that Plaintiff is not a responsible party in any way liable for the environmental conditions existing at the Site or responsible for any response costs; and/or
 - f. Finding, pursuant to the Texas Health & Safety Code, Plaintiff is a *de minimis* party and its equitable and legal responsibility for those costs should not exceed a nominal share.
64. Plaintiff further prays for reasonable attorney's fees and reasonable costs pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 37.009 and Texas Health & Safety Code § 361.342, and for any other relief Plaintiff may show itself to be justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ John A. Riley

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